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Treaties and Nationalization: The People's
Republic of China Experience
By JAY S. LAIFMAN*
Member of the Class of 1988
[N]o question is of greater importance to an investor than the possibil-
ity of nationalization. For if his venture is likely to be nationalized, it
matters little what incentives he is offered.
I. DELUPIS, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT OF DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 135 (1973).
I. INTRODUCTION
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of
America are currently negotiating a new investment protection treaty.'
The existing trade-related treaties between the PRC and the United
States do not adequately address nationalization.2 This Note examines
the risk of nationalization in the PRC today and suggests an approach
for the new treaty that balances the differences between the United States
and the PRC3 and increases the likelihood of compensation in the event
of nationalization.
Part I presents the current political climate of, investment in, and
the risk of nationalization by the PRC. Part II examines the inadequa-
cies of the PRC's new investment laws when it is applied to nationaliza-
tion. Part III presents the use of treaties as a solution to both the
problems with the PRC's new laws and the theoretical differences be-
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Alfred N. Goodman, Esq., whose
help made this Note possible.
1. Horsley, Comments on Laws and Legal Development Affecting Foreign Investment in
China, 3 CHINA L. REP. 175, 179 (1986).
2. Throughout this Note, the definition of nationalization will be the taking possession of
assets and rights of foreigners by the government. Governments nationalize property in a
particular class in order to advance social reforms and to place the means of production under
state control. Governments also expropriate property. The taking in expropriation is usually
directed toward individuals. Nonetheless, this definition will include both nationalization and
expropriation because both involve similar issues regarding compensation.
3. See notes infra 117-48 and accompanying text.
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tween the countries. This section also examines existing treaties to iden-
tify possible problems, and concludes by suggesting a new approach to a
nationalization treaty between the PRC and the United States.
A. The PRC Today
In 1977, Deng Xiaoping, the current leader of the PRC, set forth
policies to modernize the PRC in industry, agriculture, science, and de-
fense.4 He emphasized that the PRC needed outside help to develop its
economy and technology.' Deng Xiaoping believed that access to the
West's scientific and technical knowledge was necessary for his nation's
development.
6
Prior to Deng Xiaoping, the PRC practiced self-reliance and refused
to allow foreign investment within its boundaries.' In 1949, when the
PRC became a new nation, Mao Tse-tung' and the PRC viewed the
United States as imperialist and, thus, an enemy of the PRC.9
However, Deng Xiaoping felt that advanced technology and equip-
ment would help to develop the PRC's economy and technology,10 and
could be imported without compromising the PRC's policy of self-reli-
ance.11 Thus, the PRC began encouraging outside investment in order to
foster growth. 2 This outside investment is not protected from the risk of
nationalization.
B. The Investor
Today, the United States is the biggest investor in the PRC,13 with
over $10 billion invested. 4 Many investors, however, still hesitate to in-
4. M. SCHALLER, THE UNITED STATES & CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 187
(1979).
5. A. GREGOR, THE CHINA CONNECTION 82 (1986).
6. Id.
7. M. SCHALLER, supra note 4, at 187.
8. Mao Tse-tung was the first leader of the PRC. A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 21-23.
9. Id. at 55-56. China's anti-imperialist policy stems from past oppression by imperialist
nations. Chinese leaders today still view imperialism as the key evil and view many U.S. poli.
cies as imperialist. It has been suggested that the recent rapprochement with the U.S. is a
temporary measure to gain technology and pacify the USSR. Once these goals have been met,
the strongly anti-imperialist Chinese may again turn on the U.S. .d. at 82-84.
10. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, China's Joint Venture Law: Part 1, 1 CHINA L. REP. 5, 8
(1981) ("China's success in modernization depended upon the importation of advanced tech-
nology and equipment.").
11. Id. at 8; A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 82.
12. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 5.
13. Han Xu, Sino-American Economic Cooperation, 3 CHINA L. REP. 160, 161.
14. Id.
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vest in the PRC because of the nation's volatile political situation.' 5 The
risk of nationalization, which can result from such instability,1 6 has often
been a key factor influencing an investor's decision not to invest.17 Un-
fortunately, no legal guarantees against nationalization exist.
A nation has full sovereignty over its property. The United Nations
has resolved that a "[v]iolation of the rights of peoples and nations to
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the
spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the
development of international co-operation and the maintenance of
peace."' 8 Further, since the United States itself has statefi that the power
of eminent domain "cannot be fettered by treaty," 9 investors cannot ex-
pect the PRC to limit its sovereignty over its property or to sign a treaty
that guarantees the PRC will not nationalize. The investor must, there-
fore, look for certain guarantees in the event of nationalization. Ameri-
can investors want assurances that the PRC will reimburse money and
time invested in a foreign country in case of nationalization.20
C. The Risk of Nationalization in the PRC
The PRC has nationalized American property in the past." Cur-
rent PRC leaders claim that the PRC will not nationalize in the future.2
15. 'Serious Alarm'Among Foreign Business Community, S. China Morning Post, Feb. 26,
1987, at 8, reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, DAILY REPORT,
CHINA, Feb. 26, 1987, at K23 [hereinafter FBIS DAILY REP.].
16. G. INGRAM, EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. PROPERTY IN SouTH AMERICA 2 (1974).
17. 1. DELUPIS, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT OF DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 135 (1973).
18. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources, art. 7, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963).
19. Id. at 15-16. The U.S. has the ability to put pressure on the PRC to inhibit expropria-
tions. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act requires that, in the event
of expropriation of a U.S. investor's property, all aid to the expropriating country is to cease
until restitution is mad& 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1982). However, recently the U.S. has be-
come reluctant to apply the law. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 338.
20. I. DELUPIS, supra note 17, at 133.
21. See infira notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
22. Liu Yiu-chu Freely Discusses the Joint Venture Law, cited in Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn,
supra note 10, at 12-13 ("I think that we have forcefully propagandized our policy of not
nationalizing...."); Shen Xiaoming, cited in Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 12-13
("The foreign investor then need not worry that his capital will be nationalized without com-
pensation.... ."); Ren Jianxin, Some Legal Aspects of Our Import of Technology and Utilization
of Foreign Investment, 1 CHINA L. REP. 85, 96 (1981) ("Some leaders of the Chinese govern-
ment have answered definitely that pursuant to the joint venture law, assets of a foreign partici-
pant will not be expropriated.").
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This section examines the strength of these claims in light of past
occurrences.
1. Past Occurrences of Nationalization in China
In 1949, when the PRC was established, Mao Tse-tung pursued
China's unification and supported a variation of Marxism to lead the
Chinese people down a road of advancement.23 This plan required the
Government to control the means of production th:roughout the coun-
try.24 During the following years, the PRC nationalized many indus-
tries.25 The Government created a "state sector" :in the economy by
nationalizing financial institutions, railroads, and shipping companies.26
The PRC also took systematic steps to "confiscate" American consular
properties in the PRC.2 7
PRC nationalization also took the form of failure to pay financial
obligations incurred by a former Chinese government. In 1911, imperial-
ist China issued bonds for the development of its railroad.28 The Repub-
lic of China (ROC) stopped making interest payments on the bonds in
1939 when Japan invaded China. 29 The ROC Government fled mainland
China in 1949 and never paid interest again.3" Revenues from the rail-
roads on mainland China secured the bonds.31 Thus, an action against
the ROC, now in Taiwan, would "have been useless without a source of
mainland funds to levy against."32 Mao Tse-tung and the PRC denied
responsibility to repay the bonds.33 The PRC also denounced treaties
and loans made by the ROC because it felt the treaties and loans "dis-
grace[d] the country and stripp[ed] away its right[s]. ' '34 Further, the
23. A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 21, 23-27.
24. Id. at 38.
25. J. FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 372-75 (1979); H. McALEAVY,
MODERN HISTORY OF CHINA 344 (1967).
26. A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 38.
27. 22 DEP'T. OF STATE BULL. 551 (1950), quoted in J. HSIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN
CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF ATrrrUDES AND PRACTCE (1972). It is un-
likely that the PRC will nationalize foreigners' properties to the extent of these 1949 national-
izations. However, as discussed below, variations of it are still possible.
28. See generally Lubman & Salper, Emerging Functions of Formal Legal Institutions in
China's Modernization, 2 CHINA L. REP. 196, 264 (1982).




32. Id. at 91.
33. Id.
34. Statement by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Agreements
and Negotiations Between Kuomintang and Foreign Governments, Feb. 1, 1947, reprinted in 2
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United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission held that the PRC
would not be liable for the bonds since they were ROC obligations.3S
Another occurrence of nationalization involved the PRC's freezing
of American assets in 1950.36 This action was in response to the United
States' freezing of Chinese assets because of the PRC's intervention in the
Korean Wary.3  Although the United States was ready to release the fro-
zen assets it held, the PRC was not.38 The PRC refused to pay compensa-
tion in any form.39 Investors claimed a loss of $196.9 million.' In 1979,
the United States and the PRC finally exchanged restitution for the na-
tionalization when they signed the Settlement of Claims Treaty.41 The
treaty extinguished all United States citizens' claims against China and
the remaining Chinese claims against the United States.42 The settlement
of claims provided only $80.5 million in restitution. 4
In summary, nationalization by the PRC has taken several forms:
outright nationalization of various sectors of industry, denial of the
ousted government's financial obligations, and frozen assets. These acts
have harmed American investors in China. Compensation to Americans
for their losses has been either delayed or nonexistent. The PRC has a
clear history of nationalization.
2. The Possibility of Nationalization by the PRC in the Future
With consideration of the past nationalization by the PRC, this next
section addresses three situations that could result in nationalization in
the future: re-adjustment of investment, overthrow of the Government,
and retreat from the current open door policy.
PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 1120-21 (1. Cohen
& H. Chiu eds. 1974).
35. Jung, supra note 29, at 98-99.
36. Government Administrative Council Issues Order for the Control of American Govern-
ment and Private Property in China, reprinted in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, supra note 34, at 686-87.
37. Id.
38. Comment, The Blocked Chinese Assets United States Claims Problems: The Lump-
Sum Settlement Solution, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 51, 52-54 (1980).
39. J. HSiuNG, supra note 27, at 138.
40. Comment, supra note 38, at 57.
41. Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China, 30
U.S.T. 1957, T.LA.S. No. 9306.
42. Id.
43. Id., 30 U.S.T. 1957, at 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 9306. The rationiale for this settlement is
discussed below in the section proposing rationale for compensation for nationalization in the
new treaty.
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a. Re-Adjustment
The PRC, like other socialist countries, controls all of the country's
industry.4 Even though more decisions are now made at the local
level,45 the PRC is still a controlled economy in which the central gov-
ernment sets the pricing structure.4 The entire economy remains highly
bureaucratized.47 Under this bureaucratized system, the PRC does not
discover many inefficiencies until much money has been invested in an
industry.48 These inefficiencies force the PRC to withdraw investment
from one industry and reallocate the money in another industry.49
The PRC currently encourages joint foreign investments in technol-
ogy5" and oil-related industries.51 As it has in the past, the PRC could
decide that it has overinvested in these industries. The PRC might then
reduce investments in one industry and reallocate them elsewhere. This
reallocation is a particular risk for oil investments in which there has
been. tremendous investment but little success. 52 Without sufficient state
support, the investor might be unable to continue. Although no outright
taking occurs, deliberate actions by the host country that make continu-
ing the investment fruitless is also a form of nationalization. This form is
known as "creeping expropriation."5"
44. A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 166-67.
45. For example, some business managers are now allowed to invest 10% of their profits
in bonuses, new technology, and growth. Id. at 167.
46. Id. at 171.
47. Id. at 158-59.
48. Id. at 157-58.
49. Renmin Ribao Calls for Cutting Investments, reprinted in FBIS DAILY REP., Feb. 24,
1987, at K25.
50. See generally G. INGRAM, supra note 16. Nations have refrained from nationalization
because their citizens lack the knowledge to use foreign technology. If a nation, however,
understands the technology employed by the foreigners, there is less risk of losing the techno-
logical advances. Id. at 356. The PRC requires foreign investors to share their technology and
to train Chinese workers rather than simply sell the advanced equipment. Ren Jianxin, supra
note 22, at 93. Therefore, the current government or any new leadership would know that the
technology could be used without the foreigners, and the risk of losing the technology would
not be inhibiting.
51. The PRC classifies such investments as "joint development ventures." Chang & Pow,
Trade and Investment Law and Practice in the PRC, 3 CHINA L. REP. 5, 44-45 (1985) (as
opposed to "joint ventures," which deal in only manufacturing ventures).
52. The foreigners must pay the cost of the exploration until they find oil. Chang & Pow,
supra note 51, at 45. Two point four billion dollars have already been invested in exploration
equipment. Id. Since little oil has been found, the investors have much to lose if the Govern-
ment decides it no longer wants foreigners to extract Chinese oil. Armacost, The People's
Republic of China: Economic Reform, Modernization and the Law, 3 CHINA L. REP. 153, 154
(1986).
53. Marra, OPIC Programs in China and Problems Faced by Investors, 2 CHINA L. REP.
170, 171 (1986).
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b. The Overthrow of the PRC Government
In the past, nationalization has been a tool of power for govern-
ments. Most occurrences of nationalization, unaccompanied by compen-
sation, have immediately followed the overthrow of or drastic changes in
governments. 4 The leaders of the new government blamed the over-
thrown government for yielding to the pressures of foreigners. 5 Thus,
the new leaders used the foreigners as scapegoats to display control over
the situation. 6 In nationalizing the property, the new government com-
mitted a highly publicized act, which led the public to believe that the
new government was crusading for their interests.5
In the PRC, the overthrow of the government involved a change to
socialism. Socialist ideology mandates that neither foreigners nor citizens
can own property.58 The 1949 actions by the PRC exemplify nationaliza-
tion following an overthrow of a government.5 9
c. Retreat from the Open Door Policy
The future of the PRC's present government and policies is unsure.
Since the Opium Wars, when foreigners manipulated and abused
China," the Chinese have been very sensitive to foreigners.6" Sensitivity
to foreign encroachment led to a closed door policy, which lasted for
over seventy years.62 The doors have been open only because Deng
Xiaoping felt that gains from the West could be obtained without the
abuse of the past.63 The PRC is still known for its tendency to embrace
the past," and cries of cultural contamination have been noted by ob-
servers of United States-Sino political affairs.6" In the past, the involve-
ment of foreigners in a host country provoked the citizens to seek
isolation.66 Nonetheless, many Chinese argue that the new trend is irre-
versible because the current government is more stable than past Chinese
54. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 356.
55. Id. at 10, 357.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id.
58. P RIBEIRO, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW i
(1977).
59. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
60. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 6-9. See also S. SCHRAM, MAO TsE-TuNG 23-
24 (1966) (humiliation and awareness of it).
61. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 6-9.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
64. See Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 6.
65. Armacost, supra note 52, at 155.
66. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 359 (experiences in South America).
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governments, and that drastic change or overthrow is unlikely. 67
The current open door policy does not have to be completely elimi-
nated for investors to be harmed. The future of Deng Xiaoping's new
policies68 depends partially upon whether his supporters remain in
power. Currently, Deng Xiaoping's policies are under attack by those
who want to return to isolation.69 If the isolationists' influence upon the
Government results in less outside investment, effects similar to realloca-
tion7' could result. -In both situations, no direct taking occurs, yet the
investor loses his expected return on the investment.
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs)71 and joint ventures
(JVs)72 are potential targets of nationalization. With the WFOE, the
PRC has widened the trade door more than ever before. Any restriction
of trade policy might first affect the WFOEs. Total[ foreign ownership
remains controversial in China because of China's history of abuse by
foreigners. 7' The WFOE investors provide one hundred percent of the
funds and management.74 Thus, they have more freedom than JV inves-
tors, who must share management decisions with Chinese partners."1
The PRC, due to pressure by isolationists or abuses by foreigners, 76
might decide to discontinue WFOEs in favor of JVs, over which they
have greater control. Nationalization could occur, without a complete
reversal of policy, in the form of the American investors' inability to con-
tinue independent operation of their investments.
67. Zhao Says Reform, Opening Policies "Irreversible," Xinhua, Feb. 25, 1987, reprinted in
FBIS DAILY REP., Feb. 25, 1987, at K24.
68. See Gittings, Deng Xiaoping, reprinted in CHINA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY 453 (M,
Coye ed. 1984).
69. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 10.
70. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
71. Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
[WFOE Law] (1986), trans. in 8 E. AsIAN EXECuT vE REP., May 15, 1986, at 26 (trans. Paul,
Weiss, Rifind, Wharton & Garrison).
72. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment [JV Law] (1979), trans in 18 I.L.M. 1163 (July 1979) (reproduced from
BEIING REv., July 20, 1979, at 24-26).
73. Sin, Slow Growth for Foreign Wholly Owned Ventures, S. China Morning Post, May 1t
1987, reprinted in FBIS DAILY REP., May 1, 1987, at K9-10.
74. WFOE Law art. 2.
75. JV Law art. 6.
76. The operation of the investment can be a major factor that increases the risk of nation.
alization. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 4-6, 352-58. Even small mistakes and abuses caused
by other foreigners can create problems for an investor. Id. In the PRC investment atmos-
phere, this can be critical because of the PRC's sensitivity to foreign encroachment. Tao Tal
Hsia & Hahn, supra fiote 10, at 6.
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I. INADEQUATE PROTECTION FROM PRC LAW
A. General Problems With PRC Law
When nationalization occurs, the investor should first turn to the
host country's own legal system for compensation. This gives the country
an opportunity to make reparations without making the issue
international.
The PRC's legal system, however, does not provide for reparation.
Before foreigners began investing in the PRC, no need for private invest-
ment laws existed.7 7 When the PRC decided to encourage investors, it
developed the first investment laws.7" Inadequacies permeate the new
laws because of the Chinese lawmakers' lack of experience and desire to
preserve flexibility. 79 These new laws have been criticized for being in-
complete and for not including adequate tax, corporate, and other com-
mercial laws.80 Laws promulgated to clarify murky legal areas are not
always readily accessible,8" nor uniformly applied. 2 The PRC, however,
continues to improve its legal system.8 3 Enforcement of the laws will re-
duce the likelihood of nationalization of investments in PRC. However,
once nationalization does occur, the existing laws offer little guidance to
effectuate compensation.
B. PRC Written Law Applicable to Nationalization
Currently, only two written laws deal with nationalization and the
investor: the Joint Venture Law' and the Wholly Foreign-Owned En-
terprise Law.85 These laws provide some hope and guidance for the
investor.
1. The Joint Venture Law
On July 1, 1979, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (Joint Venture Law)
was adopted. 6 The Joint Venture Law represents a dramatic step as the
77. Lubman & Salper, supra note 28, at 262.
78. Id.
79. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 6-7.
80. Id.
81. See Horsley, supra note 1, at 175-76; Marra, supra note 53, at 174.
82. Lubman & Salper, supra note 28, at 265-66.
83. Since 1981, The PRC has enacted over 100 laws relating to business in the PRC. Han
Xu, supra note 13, at 160.
84. See supra note 72.
85. See supra note 71.
86. See supra note 72.
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first PRC law officially providing for foreign investment on Chinese
soil. 7 The Joint Venture Law is mostly a statement of the PRC's intent
and policies.88 It has only fifteen articles, which outline a general legal
framework for joint ventures. Ren Jianxin, Director of the Legal Affairs
Department of the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade, has reduced the numerous regulations governing joint ventures
into a few key points.8 9 First, the PRC requires an investment to benefit
China's development.90 This requirement prevents investors from ignor-
ing the PRC's needs. In the past, host countries have criticized foreign
investors for pursuing their own profits.9 Second, the PRC requires that
investments augment foreign exchange.92 By restricting imports, the
PRC will increase foreign currency reserves and thus maintain a positive
trade balance before allowing more imports. This requirement should
reduce the likelihood that the investment will result in decapitalization of
the local economy, which has been a factor in past nationalization.93
Third, the PRC requires an investment to conform to environmental pro-
tection standards.94 This requirement should result :in less destruction of
the landscape. 95 These requirements do not increase the likelihood of
compensation once nationalization occurs. If they are enforced and fol-
lowed, however, they should reduce the likelihood of nationalization by
eliminating factors that have turned countries against foreigners.
In the past, countries eager to encourage foreign investment have
found foreign investment to be detrimental to the host country due to the
lack of control over the foreigner's activities.96 The PRC requires a
highly subjective case-by-case inquiry into each investment's qualities
and defects,97 including the factors outlined above. This inquiry should
help prevent some abusive investments.
Investments such as coal mining,9" however, seem directly counter
to the environmental protection requirements. One particular invest-
87. Chang & Pow, supra note 51, at 9-10.
88. Ren Jianxin, supra note 22, at 93.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 8, 355.
92. Ren Jianxin, supra note 22, at 93.
93. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 8.
94. Ren Jianxin, supra note 22, at 93.
95. Natural resource extraction investments have been subject to nationalization more
often than investments in manufacturing. See generally G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 5.
96. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 10-11.
97. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 6.
98. Similar investments have been nationalized in Peru, G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 19-
104, and Chile, id.
[Vol, I I
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ment in the PRC has resulted in the world's largest open-pit coal mine?'
and thus potentially irreparable harm to the landscape. This suggests
that abusive investments are still possible.
Like other PRC laws, the new Joint Venture Law has many
problems. Problems with the Joint Venture Law have included vague-
ness, nonuniform interpretation, and requirements that upset PRC citi-
zens."c° The Joint Venture Law only vaguely addresses nationalization.
Article 2 states, "The Chinese Government protects, by the legislation in
force, the resources invested by a foreign participant in a joint venture
and the profits due him pursuant to the agreements, contracts and arti-
cles of association authorized by the Chinese Government as well as his
other lawful rights and interests." 101
The Joint Venture Law leaves unclear the nature and extent of com-
pensation to be paid to foreigners whose investments are nationalized.
Even PRC officials disagree upon the meaning of this section. One offi-
cial has said "appropriate" compensation is the standard,102 while an-
other said "reasonable" compensation is the standard.10 3 In either case, it
is unclear what either word actually means with regard to how much of
the nationalized investment the investor will be able to recover. Such a
standard is not helpful. More concrete terms are needed.
Another problem is that requirements stated in supplemental regu-
lations may upset many PRC citizens. In the Provisions on Labor Man-
agement in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,
articles 8 and 11 are potentially problematic for PRC citizens. These
articles require foreign companies to pay higher wages than state-run
companies. 'I In the past, foreign companies created a new elite by treat-
ing their employees better than the host government. The citizens who
did not benefit envied the citizens who did and resented the foreigners for
creating the imbalance. 05 Currently in the PRC, certain radicals con-
demn these bonuses, or higher wages. 10 6 Consequently, the Joint Ven-
ture Law itself imposes a standard that could result in future problems
for the investor.
99. Han Xu, supra note 13, at 161.
100. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 72.
102. Tao Tai Hsia & Hahn, supra note 10, at 12.
103. Ren Jianxin, supra note 22, at 96.
104. Provisions on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ment, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Oct. 15, 1980, at 26.
105. Cf. G. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 10-12.
106. Tao Tai Hsia & Haun, China's Joint Venture Law: Part II, 1 CHINA L REP. 61, 82
(1981).
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2. The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law
The most recent PRC law developed for foreign investments is the
Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOE Law), which was
promulgated on April 12, 1986.107 By following the Law's extensive reg-
ulations, a foreigner can invest in the PRC without forming a partnership
with a Chinese citizen. 108 Previously, wholly foreign-owned enterprises
were limited to a few selected zones and cities. Otherwise, a foreign in-
vestor could only operate as a partner with a Chinese national. '9
Article 5 of the WFOE Law specifically addresses nationalization:
"The State will not nationalize or carry out expropriation of wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises; in special circumstances, in accordance with the
needs of the common social interest, the State may in accordance with
legal procedures carry out expropriation, and give commensurate
compensation." 110
The first sentence of the article is quite a bold statement. It clearly
states that the PRC will not nationalize. However, the rest of the article
mitigates its strength. The PRC will nationalize in special circum-
stances. The article does not suggest what these special circumstances
are. Rather, it states only that they will be "in accord with the needs of
the common social interest." '111 Social interest is intrinsically involved
with almost everything a nation does. Likewise, most past nationaliza-
tion has been connected with the interests of society. 112 Therefore, arti-
cle 5 neither forbids nationalization, nor makes it any less likely than
nationalizations in the past.
Article 5 refers to legal procedures that are to be followed in the
event of nationalization expropriation.1 13 Such procedures could be
helpful for both the investor and the PRC. The foreigner could insure
that his investment was not improperly taken. The PRC could legitimize
its actions by following the procedures. However, the article does not
provide procedures, nor does it specify where to find them.
Article 5 requires "commensurate payment" for enterprises that are
107. See supra note 71.
108. WFOE Law art. 2.
109. Macneil, Law On Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises in China, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., May 15, 1986, at 9.
110. Id. This article only covers wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Therefore, it affccts
neither investments created under the Joint Venture Law, nor investments created under the
Joint Development Law.
111. Id.
112. I. DELUPIS, supra note 17, at 76-78.
113. WFOE Law art. 5.
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nationalized.114 This term does not provide an adequate standard for
determining compensation. It is unclear whether the standard to be ap-
plied to determine a commensurate payment should be the value of the
property to the PRC, the foreigner, or another foreigner. Nor does the
article specify how or by whom the valuation should be made.'
Thus, the new WFOE Law attempts to give the foreigner assurances
regarding nationalization. However, the wide exception and vague pro-
cedures and standards drastically diminish the impact of the statement
against nationalization.
C. The Application of International Law
When no PRC law covers a topic, Chinese leaders claim that inter-
national law applies. 115 However, due to the difficulty in ascertaining the
applicable Chinese law on a particular subject, investors cannot be sure
whether international law applies or whether they are simply unsuccess-
ful in discovering the applicable law. Further, the PRC could create a
law or change one of their policies to avoid the application of interna-
tional law. Such tactics have been used before in other countries for the
sole purpose of limiting the rights of foreign investors after an illegal act
has occurred.'16 This assertion by Chinese leaders, therefore, does not
help determine what law is applicable in any given situation.
IV. TREATIES AS A REMEDY
Since the PRC laws do not provide all the answers for the investor, a
treaty between the United States and the PRC could fill some gaps. For
example, a treaty could resolve some uncertainty by developing a stan-
dard for compensation or defining the nature of property.
A. The Lack of an Agreement on a Standard for Compensation
One of the problems facing the investor is the lack of agreement on
an international standard for compensation. The United States and other
Western nations hold one theory, while other nations seem to have their
own different theories. Because there is no agreement on the rationale
behind the duty of the nationalizing nation to compensate, many nations
114. Id.
115. Wei Jiaju, Law on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interests, 3 CHINA L REP.
166, 167 (1986).
116. For a list of governments that have changed internal policies to the detriment of the
investor, see I. DELUPIS, supra note 17, at 27-29.
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believe they have no such duty.1 17
The United States believes in prompt, adequate, and effective pay-
ment.118 In other words, the payment should be within a reasonable pe-
riod of time without delay, 119 equivalent to the value of the property
taken, 120 and in a currency the foreigner can utilize.1 21 Although the
standard is vague, the Western European countries also support this view
on restitution.1 22 Together, the United States and the Western European
countries have attempted to make this view an international standard
through United Nations agreement.1 23 However, developing countries
have not accepted these standards.1 24
Socialist and developing countries have at times recognized a duty
to compensate, but not according to the Western "prompt, adequate, and
effective" standard.1 21 Their limited recognition is a result of the diplo-
matic need to remain on good terms with the international
community.
12 6
Li Hao-p'ei, one of the few PRC commentators on the subject of
nationalization, rejects the Western notion of prompt, adequate, and ef-
fective relief. 27 He states that the Western theory "is obviously based
upon the sanctity and inviolability of private property advocated by the
bourgeoisie."1 28 Rather, he advances the notion supported by other so-
cialist countries that no obligation to pay any compensation by the na-
tionalizing country exists:
To require the nationalizing state to make compensation to own-
ers of foreign nationality may frustrate the exercise of the sovereign
right of state to carry out economic and social reform .... [T]he na-
tionalizing state only has an obligation not to discriminate .... [11f it
does not compensate nationals .. .then [there is] no obligation to
117. Note, Creating a Framework for the Re-Introduction of International Law to Contro-
versies Over Compensation for Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 163, 167 (1982).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 187 (1965).
119. Id. § 189.
120. Id. § 188.
121. Id. § 190.
122. R. RiBEIRO, supra note 58, at 90-91.
123. Id. at 83-84.
124. Note, supra note 117, at 167.
125. R. RIBEIRO, supra note 58, at 115.
126. Id. at 115.
127. Li Hao-p'ei, Nationalization & International Law, reprinted in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, supra note 34, at 718-29.
128. Id. at 720.
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foreigners.' 2 9
The United States and the PRC, therefore, do not agree upon a standard
for compensation.
B. Theoretical Differences on the Nature of Property
Another problem facing an investor involves the differing views of
the nature of property ownership held by Western and developing na-
tions. Western nations believe ownership can only be effected through
the power of the state by eminent domain.13 0 In addition, when a state
exercises eminent domain, it owes the owner restitution."3 ' This Western
view is a progression from the Roman view of absolute possession and
control.'3 2 On the other hand, the developing countries argue that land
has a social function, and thus belongs to the state for the accomplish-
ment of its social goals. 3 The possessor of land and other property does
not own it. Rather, she uses it for the social good. Therefore, if she loses
possession, she does not lose property rights because the nation does not
recognize those rights.'3 4 These opposing views on property rights reveal
the reason why Western and developing nations do not agree on
compensation.
C. Treaties Used as a Solution to Theoretical Differences
Because of these differing views, there is no single international law
for restitution, nor one law to satisfy all nations.135 When an investor
deals with nations that do not accept Western views, the applicable law
can only be the law of that individual nation.13 6
Commentators have suggested that the United States discard the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" standard,13 especially since England
and France, strong supporters of the standard, at times have been unable
to comply.' 3 8 As far as a Western investor is concerned, however, the
129. Id. at 722.
130. See A. LOWENFELD, EXPROPRIATIONS IN THE AMERICAS 5 (1971).
131. Id.
132. L RIBEIRO, supra note 58, at 6.
133. Id. at 4-8.
134. Id. at 27, 122-25.
135. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 130, at 5-7.
136. See Proceedings of the 1972 Regional Conference of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law at the University of Denver College ofLaw, 2 DENVER J. OF INTIL L. & P. 125, 163
(1972) (statement of J. Duru).
137. Note, supra note 117, at 178.
138. R. RIBEIRO, supra note 58, at 96-97 (because of the wide-scale nature of the national-
izations, the nations lacked sufficient capital).
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result would be a denial of fair compensation.t 39 Few investors would be
willing to take the risk of investment without some guarantee of
compensation.
Treaties have been used to tailor agreements to meet the concerns of
differing nations. Between two nations, treaties can address individual
needs effectively. By focusing on an end result, the parties can avoid
reference to state policies. In the area of nationalization, if the parties
can agree when and how much compensation is due, and for what rea-
sons, the reason each nation came to that conclusion is insignificant. For
example, one party may view an agreement as a means to preserve prop-
erty rights, while the other party perceives the treaty as a means to pre-
serve beneficial trade relations.
In spite of such statements as Li Hao-p'ei's, a0 the PRC has previ-
ously reached agreements with the United States regarding compensa-
tion. 4 ' The PRC's rationale for compensation is coextensive with its
rationale for rapprochement with the United States.
The PRC agreed to rapprochement with the United States for two
reasons-fear of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and
need for technological advancement. By 1969, relations between the
PRC and the USSR had deteriorated.142 The PRC feared the USSR was
preparing to attack the PRC.143 Although the PRC still considered the
United States an enemy, 1" its immediate fears of the USSR and USSR
collusion with the United States led to temporary rapprochement with
the United States in 1979.' The PRC hoped that friendly relations
would prevent collusion between the USSR and the United States and
invasion by the USSR.
Previous accommodations by the PRC have been temporary and un-
reliable. For example, the PRC and its opponents, the Nationalists,
joined forces to fight the Japanese. Once the Japanese were defeated, the
Nationalist Party became the PRC's enemy again.' 46 This suggests that
this rapprochement with the United States could be equally unreliable.
139. See I. DELUPIS, supra note 17, at 133.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
141. Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China, 30
U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 9306; Investment Guarantees, Oct. 30, 1980, United States-People's
Republic of China, T.I.A.S. No. 9924.
142. A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 75-76.
143. Id. at 76.
144. The PRC considered the U.S. imperialist and consequently an adversary. Id. See
supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
145. See generally A. GREGOR, supra note 5, at 79-89.
146. Id. at 82-84.
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Another rationale for rapprochement was the PRC's need for tech-
nological advancement.1 47 Deng Xiaoping, as opposed to Mao Tse-tung,
felt that the PRC needed the United States' technology for develop-
ment.148 This need will remain whether or not the PRC finds other
means to fight imperialism. In negotiating a treaty, therefore, the United
States can use these needs as inducements for Chinese agreement on
compensation. However, since the former rationale is more likely to end
than the latter, the latter should be emphasized.
1. Specific Attempts at Treaties
Countries have used bilateral and multilateral treaties to address the
issue of protection of investments from nationalization. There are basi-
cally two types of bilateral treaties: Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion Treaties (FCNs),14 9 and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).15°
BITs are relatively new and considered by the United States to be the
prototype for future treaties and a replacement for the older FCN trea-
ties.' The FCN incorporated the "prompt, adequate, and effective"
Western standards. 52 However, in some nations, the treaties have been
cited by the parties and then denied enforcement by the host nation. 1 3
The BIT should be an improvement over the FCN, with its greater legal
protection and clearer terms.1 54 Although it uses different adjectives for
"prompt, adequate, and effective," it is really very similar. The United
States has recently signed a BIT with Egypt.155 However, Egypt is al-
ready complaining that the treaty conflicts with the needs of a developing
country and wants to change it. 156
Nations have also attempted multilateral treaties. To date, none
have been successful. 5 7 Like previous bilateral treaties, a middle ground
147. Id. at 82.
148. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
149. E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
CoUNTRIEs 120-23 (1965).
150. See. e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, 21 I.L.M. 927 (1982).
151. United States; Egypt Sign First Treaty on Bilateral Investments, 18 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 17 (1982).
152. F_ NWOGUGU, supra note 149, at 120-23.
153. I. DELUPIS, supra note 17, at 112. The PRC itself has denied treaties written by its
former government, the ROC. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Note, An Examination of Compensation Terms in the United States-
Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L 287, 288 (1984).
155. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments,
supra note 150.
156. Note, supra note 154, at 301.'
157. For examples, see E. NWOGUGU, supra note 149, at 136-59 (discussing the Draft Con-
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has been difficult to find.158 Since multilateral treaties involve more
views and opinions, solutions of disputes are nearly impossible.
One problem with multilateral treaties has been the insistence by the
Western nations on certain principles.159 Meanwhile, the developing na-
tions fear the restrictions these treaties may place upon their freedom and
development. 1" Negotiators have been softening their insistence on clas-
sic nationalization requirements. 61  However, others have felt that any
of the multilateral treaties proposed so far would be worse than none at
all. Many differing opinions would result in an agreement that would
leave the investor open to a threat of nationalization without compensa-
tion. 1 62  Nonetheless, as suggested below, 163 some practical solutions
may still exist.
V. CURRENT PRC TREATIES
The current investment treaties between the United States and the
PRC are inadequate to meet the needs of the investor. The PRC has
treaties with other countries that are only marginally better.16  Negotia-
tions for a new treaty with the PRC should address the problems of these
older treaties.
A. PRC-United States Treaties
Presently, the United States and the PRC have two treaties. They
are the Trade Relations Treaty 65 and the Investment Guaranties
vention on the Protection of Foreign Property, the International Convention on Treatment of
Foreigners, and the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization),
158. Id. at 156.
159. These principles are as follows:
(1) Both capital-exporting and capital-importing states should be parties to any mul-
tilateral convention created. (2) Foreign private investment should not be discrimi-
nated against and is to be accorded fair treatment. (3) Expropriation or other
dispossession of private property must be accompanied by the payment of fair, effec-
tive and adequate compensation. (4) States must respect their contractual undertak-
ings made in connection with foreign investments. (5) There should be an impartial
tribunal to settle all disputes arising from the convention.
Id. at 154.
160. Id. at 157.
161. See R. RIBEIRO, supra note 58, at 94.
162. E. NWOGUGU, supra note 149, at 156.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 186-92.
164. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
165. Treaty on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China, 31
U.S.T. 4652, T.I.A.S. No. 9630.
[Vol, I11
PRC Treaties and Nationalization
Treaty.166
The Trade Relations Treaty does not provide specific protection for
the investor regarding compensation for expropriation. Article H pro-
vides the investor with "Most Favored Nation" treatment.1 67 Most Fa-
vored Nation treatment is treatment accorded within a nation that is as
favorable as treatment the nation accords any third country's nationals,
companies, products, vessels, or other objects in similar situations.1 63
However, as this Note will argue, nationals of other countries do not
receive adequate protection. Therefore, this treaty does not improve the
situation for the American investor.
The Investment Guaranties Treaty also fails to provide adequate
protection. Although the treaty recognizes the United States right to sub-
rogation for purposes of investment insurance from the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC),1 69 it does not require the PRC to pay
compensation.'70 Nor does the treaty set any standards for relief,
"prompt, adequate, and effective" or otherwise. Yet it is a step forward,
since it shows the PRC does recognize some rights for investors.
B. The PRC-France Treaty
In the past few years, the PRC has signed treaties with France,17 1
Sweden, 172 Romania, 173 the Federal Republic of Germany, 7 4 and
Belgium, 175 which are more extensive than the United States treaties.
The Sino-France Treaty176 signed in 1984 is an example. Like the United
States-PRC treaty, it contains a Most Favored Nation clause 7 7 and
166. Treaty on Finance: Investment Guarantees, Oct. 30, 1980, United States-People's Re-
public of China, T.I.A.S. No. 9924.
167. Treaty on Trade Relations, art. H, supra note 165, 31 U.S.T. at 4653.
168. E. NwOGUGU, supra note 149, at 123.
169. Marra, supra note 53, at 170. OPIC is an agency of the U.S. Government that pro-
motes American investment in developing countries by providing nationalization insurance to
private investors. OPIC will only insure investment projects in nations that have signed a
treaty recognizing OPIC's right to subrogation to the insureds' claims. Id.
170. See id. at 170-74.
171. Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, Mar. 10, 1984, People's Republic of China-Republic of France, 24 I.LM. 550 (1985).
172. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 29, 1982, Sweden-People's
Republic of China, 21 I.L.M. 477 (1982).
173. See China: Bilateral Investment Promotion Treaty Program, 24 LLM. 537 (1985).
174. See id.
175. Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 4,
1983, Belgium-People's Republic of China, 24 I.LM. 538 (1985).
176. Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, supra note 171, at 550.
177. Id. at 553.
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agrees to insurance subrogation. 178 There the similarities with the
United States treaties end.
The French treaty specifically covers expropriation. 79 Although
the standard of compensation is obviously influenced by Western
thought, it has a few improvements. Compensation must be appropriate,
made with no unjust delay, and fully transferable. 180 Although the term
"appropriate" is virtually equivalent to the term "adequate," neither of-
fers a method to actually determine an amount. 1 8 1 The term "no unjust
delay" is synonymous with the term "prompt." Also, article 8182 of the
treaty describes a very structured time frame for review.'8 3 However, the
article mentions no time frame for the prompt payment of an award.
Delay can be crippling to the investor who is waiting for millions of dol-
lars. A time schedule for payment and fines for late payment might facil-
itate a quicker response.' 84
The term "fully transferable" is a significant improvement over the
term "effective," which is too vague. The notion of effective compensa-
tion is that compensation should be in a currency the investor can use.
That is, compensation in the form of a host country's currency can be
relatively useless to an investor. Such compensation is worthless outside
of the host country when financial institutions will not convert it. Like-
wise, it has limited value within the host country when the investor can-
not use what the country has to offer. Arguably, "effective" implies that
the compensation should be of value to the investor. The term "fully
transferable" explicitly requires the host country to offer the investor
something of value.
VI. SUGGESTED TREATY IMPROVEMENTS
A. A Change in the Focus of Negotiation
The above-mentioned treaties have attempted to create a standard of
relief to investors in the event of nationalization. As discussed, the West
endorses the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard, or some slight
variation of it. This standard is aimed at how the government should
make payment once nationalization occurs, but it ignores the real issue.
178. Id. at 555.
179. Art. 4, id. at 553-54.
180. Id.
181. The many arguments involving the valuation of nationalized property are beyond the
scope of this Note.
182. Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, supra note 171, at 556-57.
183. Id.
184. See Note, supra note 154, at 300.
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More often then not, when a nation has nationalized property and is
faced with one of these treaties, it denies that it owes anything.185 It does
not even reach the stage of how compensation should be paid. The main
issue is whether compensation should be paid. The "prompt, adequate,
and effective" standard does not establish whether compensation should
be paid. The problem is convincing the nation that it has a duty in the
first place.
Current treaties do not explicitly distinguish between various de-
grees and forms of nationalization and accompanying duties to compen-
sate.' 86 This implies that the treaties require payment for all
nationalizations.
Treaty negotiators should focus on when compensation should be
due, rather than how payment is to be made. By finding some cut-off
point for when compensation is due and when it is not, negotiators will
be able to agree upon explicit rules for how compensation is to be paid.
By agreeing that at specific times the nation will owe money, negotiators
will reduce the motivation to avoid the issue by setting a vague standard.
That is, the nation will realize that a vague standard for how payment is
to be made will not affect its obligation to pay in certain limited situa-
tions. As a result, the nation will find it in its best interests to focus on
setting specific parameters to limit how much will owe. The times a na-
tion will agree that compensation is appropriate might be limited. That
is, it will stress "when" compensation is due rather than "how" to limit
their obligation. This focus would provide a more concrete rule, and
might lead to more compensation to the investor than the current treaties
allow.
Nations have been reluctant to commit themselves to any agree-
ments that provide for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.18 7
By using vague standards, nations attempt to avoid future restrictions.
By increasing security for the investor, however, these nations can in-
crease the number of foreigners interested in investing."88 This situation
is especially true in the PRC, where foreigners have been waiting for
further assurances from the PRC Government regarding investment
security.189
185. I. DELUPiS, supra note 17, at 110-13.
186. See, ag., Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments, supra note 171; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protec-
tion of Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, Egypt-United States, 21 I.LM. 927 (1982) (BIT); E.
NWOGUGU, supra note 11, at 120-23 (FCN).
187. R. RmEIRO, supra note 58, at 92.
188. L DELuPIs, supra note 17, at 27; E. NWOGUGU, supra note 149, at 9.
189. See Armacost, supra note 52, at 154.
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Current treaties with the PRC show the PRC's recognition of some
duty to compensate. The "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard
used in the PRC's treaties with other countries190 indicates that the PRC
recognizes that at some point it may owe money and will pay it. When
the compensation will be paid needs to be articulated in precise terms,
B. Finding a Diplomatic Balance
Treaty negotiators need to address concerns already expressed by
the PRC. The requirements for joint ventures under the Joint Venture
Law reflect the immediate concern of the PRC: that investments should
benefit the development of the PRC. Benefit in this context means im-
proving management techniques and production technology, respecting
the PRC culture, and protecting the environment. l91 The PRC leaders
might be interested in a treaty with conditional compensation. The pos-
sibility of losing the right to compensation would motivate foreign inves-
tors to respect the needs of the PRC. On the other hand, the power to cut
off compensation could by abused by the PRC if the ]PRC had too much
discretion in determining what has been beneficial. The PRC would be
able to punish the investor freely without being restricted by the require-
ment to compensate, even when the wrongdoing does not merit the loss
of compensation.
An alternative approach is to focus on what the PRC will do with
the property once it is nationalized. If the PRC continues to operate the
enterprise, it should owe compensation. If the PRC does not pay the
foreigner for the value of the enterprise, the PRC is clearly unjustly en-
riched.192 If the PRC does not utilize the foreigner's investment, how-
ever, the theory of unjust enrichment does not apply since the PRC
would not benefit by the investment of the foreigner. Likewise, the
West's argument that there is a clear duty to compensate in this situation
is not persuasive to the socialist Chinese. Therefore, there is no basis for
compensation when the PRC does not directly gain from the investor's
loss. This situation could be the dividing line for when compensation is
due. That is, the PRC would be obliged to pay compensation only when
unjustly enriched. Certainly, to the Westerner, many who deserve com-
pensation will not receive it. However, the PRC as a socialist country
does not recognize these property rights as the West does. Moreover, if
190. See supra notes 171-75.
191. Ren Jianxin, supra note 22, at 93.
192. For an unjust enrichment theory, see R. RIBEIRO, supra note 58, at 127-32.
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the PRC agrees to a specific obligation to compensate, it will be better
than no obligation at all, or one that is too vague to enforce.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although noteworthy, the current PRC investment laws neither
protect the foreigner from nationalization, nor insure that the investor
will be compensated once nationalization occurs. The Joint Venture Law
and the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law address nationalization.
However, both fail to be sufficiently specific and unambiguous to provide
effective guidance in the event of nationalization.
The investment treaty currently being negotiated between the PRC
and the United States should address the inadequacies of the PRC invest-
ment laws. Rather than insisting that compensation be paid in every cir-
cumstance, the United States should recognize the PRC's views on
property rights and address them in the treaty. In order to balance the
PRC's needs with the United States demands for compensation, the
treaty should base the duty to compensate on the theory of unjust enrich-
ment, requiring the PRC to pay compensation only when it continues to
use and profit from the nationalized investment. By narrowing the scope
of the duty, United States negotiators can provide a theory acceptable to
the PRC. The result would be a treaty that is precise, unambiguous, and
enforceable.
Doubts remain about the viability of the new policies and leadership
in the People's Republic of China. However, there are also signs that the
Government is stable and the economy is expanding. This emerging
world power should be respected. Treaty negotiators must recognize its
needs and concerns when developing a bilateral agreement.
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